Euro clearing after Brexit: shifting locations and oversight by Van Kerckhoven, S. & Odermatt, J.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Van Kerckhoven, S. and Odermatt, J. ORCID: 0000-0002-6073-3033 (2020). 
Euro clearing after Brexit: shifting locations and oversight. Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance, doi: 10.1108/JFRC-02-2020-0021 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/25135/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-02-2020-0021
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
Euro Clearing After Brexit: Shifting Locations and Oversight 
 
Sven Van Kerckhoven and Jed Odermatt 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (forthcoming 2020) 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of moving Central Counterparty Clearing (CCP) houses that clear 
euro-denominated transactions to the Eurozone after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union. Prior to Brexit, the City of London had a dominant position in euro-clearing, but in 
the aftermath of Brexit, clearing houses might decide to move to the EU27. Such a move would provide 
the EU27 with significant opportunities but also presents serious challenges. The development of a 
EU27 financial hub and the possibility to increase oversight over euro-denominated financial 
transactions, which were partly at the roots of the financial and Eurozone crisis, could strengthen the 
market-shaping of European financial markets. However, localizing euro-denominated transactions in 
Europe could potentially give rise to efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. 
Furthermore, the European regulatory framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the 
regulatory potential of the EU. Consequentially, there exists an important trade-off with regards to 
shifting locations that needs to be at the forefront of the discussions and the negotiations when dealing 
with Brexit. 
1. Introduction 
 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union will have a significant impact 
on the economies of both the UK and the EU. Assessing the impact of Brexit on each of the different 
sectors of the economy is a difficult task, and will crucially depend on the future relationship agreement 
between the UK and the EU that will need to be finalized at the end of the current transition period. One 
industry that will be profoundly affected is the financial industry.   
Part IV of the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom refers to financial services, but gives little indication on what 
the future relationship may look like in this field. It states that “The Parties are committed to preserving 
financial stability, market integrity, investor and consumer protection and fair competition, while 
respecting the Parties' regulatory and decision-making autonomy, and their ability to take equivalence 
decisions in their own interest.” It notes the parties have equivalence frameworks in place to recognise 
each other’s regulatory and supervisory regimes and agree to close and structured cooperation on 
regulatory and supervisory matters. Beyond this, the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration 
give little guidance on what the UK’s relationship will be in these fields post-Brexit. 
While there have been discussions about the UK becoming “Singapore-on-Thames”, that is a low-tax, 
low-regulation economy, after Brexit, the UK will likely retain a level of regulatory alignment with the 
EU. Valdis Dombrovskis, Commission Executive Vice President for an Economy that Works for 
People, recently commented that “[t]he more systemically important the market is for the EU, the more 
we import potential risks, [and] the closer the regulatory alignment that is expected.” Further, as the 
UK and EU are under pressure to secure a future relationship agreement in a narrow window, it is likely 
that issues of trade will be brought to the forefront. Although financial services represent a large and 
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important part of the UK economy, it remains unclear whether this will be included in a ‘bare-bones’ 
agreement.  
One area that is of particular importance for both the EU and UK is the future of Counterparty Clearing 
(CCP) in Europe. The City of London has become the premier location for European CCPs and their 
clearing houses. Clearing houses are financial institutions that take on counterparty credit risk between 
parties to a transaction and settle (clear) trades in financial transactions. Once a financial transaction 
has been approved by the two parties (a buyer and a seller), they submit the transaction to a CCP. The 
CCP then acts as an intermediary and assumes the role of both buyer and seller of the financial contract 
to reconcile transactions between two parties. For example, a transaction between firms A and B 
becomes two trades: A-CCP and CCP-B (for an in-depth overview of the working of CCPs, see Pirrong, 
2011 and Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). Consequently, clearing houses perform the broad functions of 
clearer and guarantor of financial transactions. In doing so, they reduce the settlement risk and provide 
valuations regarding the creditworthiness of parties, and can be deemed too important to fail (Elliott, 
2013, Wendt, 2015) due to their interconnectedness with financial institutions and markets and their 
high concentration. As the CCP acts as a guarantor for transaction participants’ failure, the involvement 
of a CCP reduces default risk for transactions. Clearing houses therefore provide vital functions to 
financial markets and are a prerequisite for the creation of a financial centre.  
In Europe, London’s infrastructure has allowed it to become the premier location for the clearing of 
Euro-denominated financial transactions. Specific to euro clearing, the cleared financial contracts on 
behalf of member firms or participants are tied to the underlying value of a financial instrument 
denominated in euros.  It has been estimated that up to 1 trillion euros of euro-denominated interest rate 
derivatives, one of the most popular financial instruments, are cleared in London every day. London 
trade accounts for about 70% of the European market in these derivatives, followed at great distance by 
France (11%) and Germany (6%) (UK Government Actuary’s Department, 2017). This has resulted in 
the establishment of a large financial industry in London dealing with euro clearing. It has been 
estimated that this trade provides London with up to £80 billion a year. It further provides a significant 
number of jobs (estimates by Batsaikhan et al., 2017 put the number at around 30.000 jobs).  
Now that the UK has withdrawn from the EU, and as the UK and EU turn to negotiating their future 
relationship, it is unclear whether the London financial industry will be able to continue clearing Euro-
denominated financial transactions. Several European rivals of the London Stock Exchange have been 
making moves towards attracting the euro-clearing business. As the change of location might result into 
the fragmentation of a London as the main financial centre, the business of clearing euro-denominated 
transactions has become a battle for the future of financial markets and their location. Politicians of 
several EU27 Member States have expressed their desire to move euro-clearing to locations such as 
Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin, and Amsterdam. As will be discussed below, it seems reasonable to expect 
that Brexit will lead to at least a partial migration of CCPs from London to the EU27. While the moving 
of CCPs to the Eurozone may provide potential benefits for the EU27, this also involves a number of 
important trade-offs. Localizing euro-denominated transactions in Europe could potentially give rise to 
efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. Furthermore, the European regulatory 
framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the regulatory potential of the EU.  
The paper approaches these questions utilizing  two main approaches to the study of European finance 
(Howarth and Quaglia, 2018). The first approach addresses questions from a supra-nationalist lens, 
focusing on how transnational actors shape European financial policy. Such actors in this context 
include the European Commission, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European 
Commission, as well as international regulatory bodies. The second approach focuses more broadly on 
inter-governmental approaches whereby EU Member States pursue their domestic interests. 
International financial centres, such as London, where transnational actors interact are subject to 
national interests are difficult to study from these scholarly approaches (Lavery al. n2018). This paper 
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combines insights from these discussions in order to shed light on what kind of policy the EU should 
undertake when dealing with the transnational financial market.  
Most studies to date have focused on the impact of Brexit on the UK’s financial sector generally. This 
contribution focuses on the clearing of euro-denominated financial transactions, and on the 
opportunities and challenges for the EU’s single financial market after Brexit. . The clearing of euro-
denominated transactions in the UK has been a long-standing point of discussion between the Eurozone, 
and its institutions, and the UK. Now that the UK has left the Union, and the future relationship is under 
intense discussion, this issue has become increasingly important.  As CCPs are a prerequisite to the 
establishment of a strong financial centre, this paper focuses on this specific type of financial institution. 
The future of other financial institutions, such as banks or insurance companies, fall outside the scope 
of this article. We argue that, to reap the benefits of moving euro-clearing into the EU27, more work is 
needed with regards to oversight and supervision of CCPs. Moreover, moving euro-clearing into the 
EU27 might bring with it challenges regarding the fragmentation of the industry. Due to the importance 
of London as a global financial centre, the future of euro clearing can also have wider effects on future 
regulation beyond the EU. The next section describes how London became the natural monopolist in 
providing clearing services. The paper then continues by discussing the cooperation and contestation 
between the UK and the other EU members in the establishment of the single financial market. It then 
addresses the economic and regulatory opportunities and challenges for the EU in moving clearing 
houses to the EU 27.  We argue that due to political disagreements in the EU 27, CCPs might be unable 
to centralize and benefit from economies of scale and scope. Such fragmentation exposes the UK and 
EU to significant costs and risks, and may undermine consistent supervision and harmonization.  
 
2. The Rise of London as European Clearing House Centre 
 
Traditionally, clearing houses were established as a way to settle cheques at a single place rather than 
having to physically clear cheques at each of the other banks individually. Consequently, clearing 
houses initially acted as a forum that eased the process of moving cash (or equivalent) from the bank 
on which a cheque was drawn to the bank in which it was deposited.  
Financial exchanges began to use clearing houses in the latter half of the 19th century. The functioning 
of clearing houses was expanded to include the bridging of the time between delivery and payment, 
which in a pre-digital world meant that it could take some time to physically transfer certificates, in 
particular in international transactions. By the start of the 20th century, many U.S. stock exchanges 
frequently used clearing houses. At that time, London was the only European stock exchange working 
with a clearing house, giving it a significant first mover advantage. The result is that London far outsizes 
other European financial districts in terms of foreign-registered monetary financial institutions, making 
it the international finance hub in the EU. It is also the place where most EU area and third country 
institutions (mostly US and Swiss) have set up a large presence, as foreign financial firms currently 
benefit from the fact that the UK license gives them access to a European passport (see Schoenmaker, 
2017). European financial integration thus greatly benefited the open and competitive UK financial 
sector. 
The role of clearing houses was further expanded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. At the 2009 
G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, the leaders of the G20 decided that all standardized derivatives contracts 
should be traded on exchanges and cleared by clearinghouses (Wouters, Van Kerckhoven and Odermatt, 
2013). This decision was taken as a result of the observation that there existed a lack of transparency 
with regards to large bilateral positions in derivative transactions (Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near collapse of AIG, both major participants in the OTC 
derivatives market, is testament to this. During the crisis, CCPs proved to be rather resilient in the face 
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of defaults of major financial institutions (Cecchetti et al., 2009). Clearing houses played an important 
role in guaranteeing the functioning of the market in times of panic and crisis as they had in earlier 
times as well (Timberlake, 1984). They ensured that the collapse of some institutions did not result in 
a global domino effect. Domanski et al. (2015) add that banks operating in systems where a larger 
portion of transactions are cleared by CCPs are less likely to suffer a significant deterioration of 
solvency when the crisis hit. Because of the G20 decision, London was able to further strengthen its 
position as the prime international financial hub in the EU due to its leading role in interest rate over-
the-counter derivatives (75% of all transactions denominated in euro) (Batsaikhan et al., 2017). 
Moreover, the G20 decision resulted in the need to novate a wide variety of over-the-counter 
derivatives, ensuring that clearing is essentially and increasingly so, the backbone of modern financial 
markets.  
 
3. Cooperation and Contestation in the Single Market 
 
The UK’s relationship with the process of European integration has been turbulent since it joined the 
EU (Bulmer and Quaglia, 2018). This has not been different with regards to the development of the 
single financial market. The UK, together with Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the 
Scandinavian states formed the market-making coalition, and always desired a more open and market-
driven integration of financial markets. The competing market-shaping coalition, with a larger focus on 
regulating financial markets at the EU level, included France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and the other 
Mediterranean countries. The market-making coalition has always been a key player and supporter in 
the development of the single financial market and in particular, the UK has had a strong influence in 
shaping the single financial market and making regulations more market-friendly than desired by some 
of the other EU Member States.  The UK’s fierce opposition to the EU’s proposed financial transaction 
tax is an example of the sharp difference in views between the UK and other Member States. 
London’s place as a hub has of course benefited the UK, as it became the premier financial centre in 
the EU.  As a result, British policy-makers have always invested a considerable amount of technical 
and human resources in order to influence the regulatory debate in the EU (Posner and Veron, 2010). 
The UK and its market-making coalition had a great influence in the drafting of the Lamfalussy 
directives, the Solvency II directive and the Payment Systems directive (Howarth and Quaglia, 2017). 
In particular after the financial crisis, the EU drafted a variety of new regulations limiting the UK’s 
influence as legislation imposed more prescriptive and burdensome requirements on financial entities 
(Wouters and Van Kerckhoven, 2011). This affected the clearing of euro-denominated financial trades 
as well. Years before Brexit, in January 2009, then French Minster Christine Lagarde stated that euro-
denominated transactions needed to be cleared in the euro area (Reuters, 2009). In 2011, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) followed suit and specified that large-scale CCPs dealing with euro-denominated 
trades should be fully incorporated in the euro area, where the full operational and managerial control 
should be located (ECB, 2011). It was deemed that these clearing houses are of systemic importance to 
the euro area. However, this location policy was immediately contested by the UK as the ECB’s policy 
recommendation would discriminate against non-Eurozone countries who are part of the EU. It would 
restrict the free movement of capital and infringe upon the right of establishment. The European Court 
of Justice eventually stated that the ECB did not have the legal powers to require such a move as the 
ECB lacks explicit regulatory competence with regards to the securities clearing systems, which could 
only be obtained via an amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (General 
Court of the European Union, 2015). In doing so, the ECJ did not explicitly address the question of 
discrimination.  
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As the EU strengthened oversight by implementing new rules and adding new institutions, market-
shaping came to dominate over the market-making approach. The two major additions in this respect 
with regards to clearing houses, was the establishment of a financial regulatory agency, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in 2011 and a body of European legislation for the regulation 
of over-the-counter derivatives and central counterparties, the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) in 2013. The supervisory role was thus assigned to ESMA, which allowed the ECB 
to focus again more narrowly on monetary policies. ESMA  provides opinions and drafts legislation, 
on which the European Parliament and the Council decide. As a result, the current set-up is similar to 
the situation in the UK, with a supervisory (but more independent) Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and the Bank of England.  
Consequently, the UK came to be seen as a delaying force, for example, with regards to legislation on 
hedge funds, rating agencies and the Financial Transaction tax. In recent years, the UK can thus be 
categorized as a pivotal outlier, often obstructing progress with regards to the oversight of financial 
markets. It can thus be expected that without the UK, the EU27 can move forward more quickly towards 
more market-shaping legislation. 
As the EU moves forward, the UK might need to have to follow up in implementing the more 
demanding European rules in its domestic legislation. After the Brexit vote, UK CCPs recognized rather 
quickly they were potentially going to lose their EU passport. As an alternative, they argued that UK 
legislation should be deemed equivalent with the EU, as EU rules require that European firms can only 
do business with, or be members to, clearing houses that are either within the Union or are recognized 
by the EU to be ‘equivalent’ (European Market Infrastructure Regulation, 2012, para. 6). Without action 
or agreement, UK-based clearing houses risk to be neither. 
If this is the case, UK-based CCPs might face more EU-based oversight aiming to shape financial 
markets more extensively. For example, the European Commission has already proposed to give the 
ESMA powers to assess out-of-EU clearing houses. If these are were to impose a systemic risk to 
Europe’s financial stability, they will have to adhere to requirements making them compliant with the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Currently, the four UK-based CCPs are recognized 
by the EU and must comply with the requirements of the EMIR. The Bank of England acts as the 
competent authority but an EMIR college of regulators, with ESMA and the ECB as members already 
oversees the functioning of the UK CCPs. Note also that most of the UK CCPs are active on a global 
scale, and are thus supervised by several market regulators in different countries.  
The EU has further proposed a draft law that instructs its regulators to check on “systemic” foreign 
clearing houses that handle large amounts of euro-denominated assets. If a foreign clearing house’s 
home regulator - the Bank of England in the case of the United Kingdom - fails to cooperate with EU 
supervisors, the Union would require the clearing of transactions for EU customers to relocate to the 
EU (Reuters, 2018). This equivalence approach ensures that CCPs are monitored by both their home 
countries and in the country where they are active (as is currently done with EU-based CCPs operating 
in the US). In this case, now that the UK has exited the EU, UK based CCPs will have to apply for 
equivalence from the European Commission in order to be able to continue their operations (EMIR, 
2012, para. 25) after approval by the ESMA, which is a time-consuming exercise. At the same time, the 
resolution of CCPs has been high on the European agenda for quite some time (Elliott, 2013; Priem, 
2018). On 28 November 2016, the European Commission presented its proposal for a regulation on the 
recovery and resolution of central counterparties .1 The text is still being discussed, and currently is 
supported by the UK treasury. Lannoo (2017) argues that this change even came about as a result of 
Brexit, as European legislators want to strengthen their supervisory powers. The impact of this piece of 
                                                            
1 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 
1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365. 
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legislation on future negotiations cannot be underestimated, but as it is currently still under 
development, future research will have to address its impact on the Brexit negotiations.    
Both the UK and the European Commission identified the issue of CCPs as a clear systemic risk in the 
case of a no-deal Brexit. On December 19, 2018, the European Commission decided to grant temporary 
equivalence to UK CCPs (European Commission, 2018b; ESMA, 2018b). ESMA already stated that it 
was preparing to recognize British clearing houses on 23 November 2018 (ESMA 2018a) after a 
communication of the European Commission (European Commission, 2018a). On 23 December 2019, 
ESMA announced that it would extend the recognition decisions for UK CCPs (ESMA 2019). The 
recognition of the UK-based CCPs by the ESMA would come into effect in the case of a no-deal Brexit. 
This was timely since clearing houses require 90 days notification in order to end membership. This 
would allow UK CCPs to continue providing clearing services. On the other side of the Channel, HM 
Treasury and the Bank of England already put such a temporary recognition in place for non-UK CCPs 
(Bank of England, 2019). However, this equivalence recognition is only temporary and will need further 
detail with regards to the necessary cooperation and information-sharing. This temporary equivalence 
will only last for one year (ESMA, 2018b) but has been extended until the end of the transition period. 
Under the existing equivalence rules, recognition is unilaterally decided upon, and revoked, by the EU 
at any given time. This temporary equivalence rule might just allow the EU to require relocation but to 
do so in a managed and controlled way.  
This would follow the line of thought of several European leaders. A relocation would provide the EU27 
with the potential to attract a large share of the financial market (Dörry and Dymski, 2018). Both UK 
based and other foreign CCPs currently based in the UK (mostly from the US and Switzerland) could 
have to move to the euro area and a European hub for clearing will need to be established. Bearing in 
mind the monopolistic nature of CCPs, politicians of several EU27 Member States are actively 
advocating for their national financial centres. As early as 5 September 2016, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, stated in a speech that moving euro clearing was a plausible move and endorsed 
Frankfurt as the new financial hub in the euro area (Express, 2018). Over the summer of 2018, French 
President Emmanuel Macron invited European financial chiefs to Paris to promote the city as a finance 
centre and to try to snatch business away from London after Brexit. On November 23, 2018, the 
governor of the Banque de France, François Villeroy de Galhau, stated that this temporary recognition 
should not last more than a year, and endorsed Paris to become the new market hub (Banque France, 
2018). Paris and Frankfurt are historically seen as the second tier financial centres, which are dominated 
by the triad New York, Tokyo and London. They are embedded within the EU27’s most powerful 
Member States, and host key European regulatory and supervisory authorities: the ECB and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt and the ESMA and the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) in Paris. Lavery et al. (2018) argue that diversity, path dependency, territory, 
and regulatory stability shape the emerging competition between Frankfurt and Paris. Some CCPs have 
already been tempted to move their operations to the euro area in light of the uncertainty about potential 
additional burdens that might arise after Brexit. Deutsche Bank has already moved half of its euro 
clearing activities from the UK to Frankfurt. This has allowed the Deutsche Boerse-owned Eurex to 
achieve a market share of 8% of euro clearing, up from virtually zero in 2017 (Independent, 2018). In 
the same vain, LCH has shifted their euro-denominated repo activity from London to Paris and the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange went live in Amsterdam. Cécile Nagel, CEO of EuroCCP, stated that 
“[t]he direction of travel is clear, there is going to be ongoing effort to drive more activity into 
continental Europe” and that “[b]eing located in the Eurozone if you’re a European CCP clearing 
denominated product, that is going to help in the medium- to long-term.” (TheTrade, 2020). That the 
transfer to the EU27 is happening is also indicated by data released by Eurex, which shows an increase 
in both the number of transactions as well as their overall size compared to previous years (Eurex, 2019, 
2020). Moreover, Eurex Clearing drafted a profit-sharing scheme on interest rate swaps, which means 
it shares its profits with member banks (Reuters, 2017). In November 2018, it even announced plans to 
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extend this profit-sharing scheme to foreign exchange derivatives and repurchase agreements (Global 
Custodian, 2018). 
Moving the financial centre of the EU (partly) from London to may bring with it benefits for the EU27, 
in terms of promoting financial stability, tax revenue, employment, and the benefits of establishing a 
financial hub. Yet this will not be an easy task.  The battle to attract parts of the London financial centre 
might lead to fragmentation of the industry and hamper the market-shaping attempts of the EU. A 
similar move from London to Frankfurt happened in the 1990s, when the market for the future on the 
Bund moved entirely from LIFFE, a London-based derivatives exchange, to DTB, a Frankfurt-based 
exchange. In that specific case of financial market history, it was shown that liquidity can be kept in the 
market even with abrupt changes. 
4. Potential for fragmentation in market clearing 
 
There is currently no existing euro equivalent to the large centralized London based clearing houses. 
The LCH.Clearnet is a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group (LSE.L) and clears the majority 
of euro-denominated transactions. The biggest euro area clearing CCPs are Eurex Clearing (GER), LCH 
SA (the Paris subsidiary of LCH Clearnet) (FRA), EuroCCP (NDL), and CCG (ITA). However, these 
are not at the level of their UK counterparts as they are more limited in product coverage (for example 
EuroCCP only clears securities) and currency coverage (LCH SA and CCG only clear euro-
denominated products). Moreover, the euro area CCPs also tend to focus on different product offerings. 
German Eurex could, if it expands significantly, take over part of the London-based clearing activities 
as it is significantly experienced in clearing a wide variety of currencies and products, but its share of 
the global euro-denominated OTC derivatives market is even much smaller than the share of France 
(2% versus 13%, Batsaikhan et al., 2017). As of 2020, Eurex notional outstanding market share in 
clearing longer-dated euro swap contracts has risen fourfold since the start of the partnership program.  
The limited size of these euro area clearing houses is problematic for the working of CCPs. First, 
fragmentation of the financial sector could lead to duplication of resources and higher transaction costs. 
Specific to clearing houses, fragmentation could lead to higher costs. Clearing activities require each 
party to the agreement to put down collateral in two ways: the initial margin and the variation margin. 
By requiring these margin deposits, CCPs are able to ‘mutualize’ credit risks, most importantly the 
default risk. The initial margin is required when signing the agreement and is decided upon an 
estimation of the riskiness of the underlying transaction. Variation margins reflect changes in the 
riskiness as the transaction comes closer to maturity. The updates of variation margins are typically 
conducted at least once per day. By requiring these margins, CCPs offer a greater transparency of the 
risks, reduced processing costs, and greater certainty in cases of default by a member. These margin 
requirements create the most significant challenges with regards to relocating UK based CCPs. CCPs 
rely on economics of scale and scope for their functioning. Economics of scale cause risk to go down 
if a higher volume of transactions is cleared. They thus create incentives for concentration and vertical 
integration. As long as negative shocks are sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial 
network enhances financial stability (Acemoglu et al., 2015). Moreover, demands for collateral lowers 
if more is cleared, as long as there is no proliferation of CCPs (Dufffie, Scheicher and Vuillemey, 2015). 
Economics of scope require a higher number of different transactions to be cleared by the same CCP. 
When multiple derivatives classes are cleared, it is always more efficient to clear them through one 
CCP rather than through several CCPs (Duffie and Zhu, 2011; Duffie et al., 2015). 
Due to these inherent economies of scale and scope, payment and settlement systems tend to concentrate 
on very few large-scale providers or even monopolies. This has been the case with the UK-based CCPs. 
In contrast, the European CCP market currently suffers from fragmentation that results in inefficiencies 
and higher costs. Current continental European CCPs do not reach the necessary scale to realize 
economics of scale and scope. The UK government estimates that margins for financial transactions 
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might go up significantly if the decision is made to shift the location from London to continental Europe 
($83 billion if remaining in the UK, $161 billion if shifted) (UK Government Actuary’s Department, 
2017). This would push up costs for European consumers and companies; and might increase risk, as 
smaller pools might not be able to absorb losses to the same extent.  
The issue of fragmentation could be addressed if one of the European cities were to grow significantly 
in size and attract most of the clearing house business. However, seeing the political atmosphere and 
the fact that both Paris and Frankfurt are already significant, albeit small, financial centres renders the 
development of a single EU27 financial centre virtually impossible. Both cities are also specialized in 
specific parts of the financial services that have to be cleared. Moreover, third country financial 
institutions, mostly branches of US and Swiss clearing houses, seem so far not be willing to move to 
the EU27. The call of the European Commission to bring all third-country business under supervision 
of ESMA has infuriated the US authorities. As a complete move from London to one of the EU27 
contenders will thus not be easy and is not expected to happen in the foreseeable future, fragmentation 
of the industry over different countries is likely to occur. As indicated before, this can also be observed 
with recent location decisions of several financial institutions.     
The issue is that fragmentation, and the ambitions of different leaders to attract the clearing house 
business might hurt the market-shaping potential of a move to the EU. This can only be mitigated by 
either choosing a single location in Europe that is capable of attracting third countries, or by continuing 
to supervise UK CCPs through European legislation. Both options carry significant challenges. 
 
5. Macroeconomic oversight 
 
This section explores whether the current legal framework in the EU is strong enough to address the 
potential disruptive impact of fragmentation on the EU’s ability to shape markets. Financial market 
infrastructure affects the stability of the financial system and the global economy through its design but 
also through its location. This relates to the settlement assets the infrastructure uses, the legal regime 
under which it operates, and the role of governance, overseers and other stakeholders in crisis situations. 
The large share of euro-denominated transactions taking place in the UK as a non-euro area country 
raises questions with regards to the ability of the Euro area to supervise these. These concerns are only 
getting more traction after the decision of the UK to leave the EU.   
The EU27 might be particularly concerned with the potential inappropriate design or malfunctioning of 
offshore infrastructure. International oversight arrangements can mitigate the loss of direct influence, 
but according to the ECB (2011) only to some extent. Now that the UK has left the EU, the EU needs 
to draft a new approach towards the regulation of clearing houses in London. Brexit could leave the EU 
with few tools to steer and supervise UK clearing houses depending on the outcome of the negotiations.  
Moreover, London-based clearing houses have in the past already upset the EU. During the Eurozone 
debt crisis, the LCH decided to raise its margin requirements for Spain and Ireland, thus aggravating 
the impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on these countries. CCPs are for-profit centres, and since there 
are only few of them the market is rather competitive. This might lead to an underinvestment in the 
mitigation of risks to the wider system, which can only be addressed by drafting appropriate legislation.  
The EU’s regulatory framework currently is not developed enough to provide harmonized oversight. 
National central banks within the EU have different legal rules, risking competition on regulatory and 
supervisory practices between Member States, potentially resulting in a race to the bottom (ESMA, 
2017). There might also be an issue with access to comprehensive and timely information, as national 
governments might favour the survival of their domestic industries rather than the broader European 
interest. Currently, most oversight of the markets is conducted by the Bank of England and the UK 
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Financial Conduct Authority. Both UK and European legislation follow the global standards set by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Security 
Commissions (IOSCO). The current principles for financial market infrastructure published by CPSS-
IOSCO consolidate previous requirements and raises the minimum standards and as such form a 
keystone for legislation. 
Further regulation is based on the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) Master 
Agreements. The ISDA, the trade body for the derivatives market, publishes the Master Agreement to 
be the standard document used to govern over-the-counter derivatives transactions. Almost all ISDA 
Master Agreements between counterparties in the EU are currently governed by English law and the 
jurisdiction of English courts (ISDA 2018). In June 2018, the ISDA published French and Irish versions 
of the 2002 Master Agreement as a response to counterparties who “want to retain specific benefits of 
EU legislation—for example, protections under certain EU national insolvency laws that require use of 
an EU member-state-law agreement in order to receive those protections.” (ISDA, 2018). There is 
discussion about whether English law Master Agreements can continue to be used post-Brexit, or 
whether EU-law governed agreements will be used. At this stage, there is still considerable uncertainty. 
The advantage of using English law would be that the well-established legal practices can continue 
(contracts and case law). This is also what market participants would presumably prefer (Batsaikhan, 
2017), but might go against EU27 Member States preferences. 
The EU27 could decide to take Brexit as an opportunity to further develop its legal financial framework. 
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), adopted in 2012, is one of the most important 
EU post-financial crisis pieces of legislation. It covers clearing of financial instruments (for example 
derivatives) and the prudential and supervisory requirements on central counterparties. From the point 
of view of the ECB, Brexit might create an opportunity and even a necessity to accelerate the 
development of its financial markets and oversight and consequently its resilience against shocks. It 
might provide impetus in addressing some of the shortcomings of the comparatively light-touch 
regulatory framework in the UK.  In the words of Christine Lagarde: “The years are over when Europe 
cannot follow a course because the British will object. Now the British are going, Europe can find a 
new elan.” (Wintour, 2016) In the case of a Brexit, the ECB already issued its preference for a change 
of location. Article 22 of the Statute of the European Systems of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank states that: the ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may 
make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and 
with other countries. This oversight role is thus deemed to be restricted to the Euro area. In 2017 and in 
light of Brexit, the ECB has already recommended to adapt this article to include [… and clearing 
systems for financial instruments…] (ECB, 2017). In a post-Brexit world this allows the ECB to 
develop more strict oversight and a more stringent legal framework with regards to clearing systems for 
financial instruments. The ECB on 20 March 2019 withdrew its recommendation as it felt that it had 
been seriously distorted by the proposed amendments to recommendation drafted by the Council and 
the Parliament. The ECB argued that under these amendments, the ECB would not be able to enjoy 
regulatory powers with respect to CCPs, which was exactly the aim of the recommendation (ECB, 
2019).  
At the same time, the EU has agreed to amend the original EMIR legislation. This allows the EU to 
conduct more stringent supervision of third-country CCPs operating in the EU (EMIR 2.2). This will 
be based on the system of equivalence and introduces a proportionate approach: some CCPs established 
outside the EU may be of such systemic importance that they require additional conditions to mitigate 
the potential risks. It further should establish a CCP Executive Session within ESMA, which will be 
responsible for monitoring and supervising all third-country CCPs by the Commission. EMIR 2.2 
further should enhance the recognition regime for third country CCPs (TC-CCPs). It introduces a 
dedicated regime for the third country CCPs which are determined to be, or likely to become, 
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systemically important for the financial stability of the European Union (EU) or of one or more of its 
Member States. 
However, only third-country clearing houses will be supervised by ESMA in the EU, while their local 
central counterparties (CCPs) would continue to be overseen by national authorities. This means that 
the business that might transfer from London to the EU27 risks to be less centrally supervised than it 
currently is. This could lead to fragmented and uncoordinated supervision, involving both national and 
EU bodies. As Germany, France and Italy prefer to maintain this current system, attempts to harmonize 
supervision might continue to fail. 
The current decision to offer equivalence to UK-based CCPs might give the ECB the time to work on 
the regulatory framework in preparation of a potential shift of location. At the same time, their failed 
attempt aiming to move forward in terms of legislation, might result in a failure of the EU to impose 
more market-shaping legislation to address potential fragmentation and a race to the bottom.  
In addition, ESMA and other bodies still need to build up their supervisory expertise in this domain. 
These mechanisms are rather recent and need to be reviewed and gather more experience. 
At the international level, the EU27 might also be able to move forward more quickly regarding global 
financial regulatory frameworks, but will lack the clout of the UK. These new tensions have already 
been witnessed at the G7 (Wouters and Van Kerckhoven, 2019).  
In the short run, the market-shaping potential of the EU could be undermined by the political stances of 
its Member States, and result in a race to the bottom, resulting in significantly more freedom for 
financial businesses. This is enabled due to some weaknesses in the current regime dealing with CCPs. 
However, in the long run, the EU could potentially push for more market-shaping legislation. 
6. Conclusions 
 
Brexit will have a serious impact on the financial industry, in particular on UK-based clearing houses. 
Over the last decades, London has become the natural monopolist in providing these services due to its 
early mover advantage and the economics of scale and scope in the offering of these services. As a 
result, most euro-denominated financial transactions are cleared in the UK, and the UK’s market-
making approach has influenced most legislation. This, in particular after the financial crisis, has been 
contested by the market-shaping forces within the EU. Some of the forces advocating a stronger role 
for EU legislation feel that the market-making approach renders the euro area more vulnerable in the 
advent of a crisis. Brexit has only strengthened these concerns as the location of the UK-based CCPs 
might make it more difficult for the EU to intervene which has led to calls to move the operational and 
managerial functions of CCPs to the continent. Currently, the decision was taken to grant UK-based 
CCPs equivalence, which allows them, for some time, to continue their operations. This equivalence 
period might allow the EU27 to develop a financial hub ready to compete with the UK and provide the 
ECB with enough time to strengthen and move forward in improving the European regulatory 
framework with regards to supervision and oversight. This would address two of the major concerns: 
EU27 CCPs are too small to work efficiently and the legal framework is partly based on the UK’s 
regulations. If the EU’s regulatory framework is strengthened, it could mitigate the risk of a race to the 
bottom, whereby the EU’s market-shaping potential is minimised.  
Political interests currently make it difficult to advance significantly towards realizing this potential. 
European leaders are currently battling over the location of CCPs as these could form the first step 
towards attracting and developing a EU27 financial hub in their domestic countries. Companies, wary 
of the risk of potential hiccups in their operations are already slowly moving part of their operations 
outside of the UK. This fragmentation imposes significant extra costs and risks. As long as harmonized 
rules and consistent supervision are lacking, and political disagreement continues, CCPs might be 
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unable to centralize and benefit from economies of scale and scope. This comes at a cost for European 
consumers and companies. The exact impact thereof, in terms of service levels, fees and operational 
costs needs to be assessed in future research. However, it is clear that the withdrawal of the UK from 
the European Union may not only weaken the UK economy, but also lead to weaker regulations and 
higher costs, hurting the EU, the UK, and their citizens.  
  
12 
 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D.A., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2015). “Systemic risk and stability in financial 
networks”, American Economic Review, Vol. 15 No.2, pp. 564-608. 
Bank of England (2019) “Statement on equivalence of the future UK legal and supervisory framework 
for central counterparties and central securities depositories”, 19/12/2019, available at: 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2018/december/boe-statement-on-equivalence-of-the-future-
uk-legal-and-supervisory-framework-for-ccps-and-csds (last accessed 13 July 2020) 
Banque France (2018). “Speech on The consequences of Brexit for the French and European financial 
sectors” Paris, 23 November 2018, available at: https://www.banque-
france.fr/en/intervention/consequences-brexit-french-and-european-financial-sectors-paris-23-
november-2018 (last accessed 13 July 2020) 
Batsaikhan, U., Kalcik, R. and Schoenmaker, D. (2017). “Brexit and the European financial system: 
mapping markets, players and jobs”, Breugel Policy Contribution, 2017/4. Breugel, Brussels. 
Bulmer, S. and Quaglia, L. (2018). “The politics and economics of Brexit”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 25 No.8, pp. 1089-1098. 
Cecchetti, S., Gyntelberg,S. and Holanders, M. (2009). “Central counterparties for over-the-counter 
derivatives”, BIS Quarterly Review, September, pp. 45-58. 
CityUk (2014). “Analysing the case for EU membership: Does the economic evidence stack up?”, 
available at: https://www.thecityuk.com/research/analysing-the-case-for-eu-membership-does-the-
economic-evidence-stack-up/ (last accessed 13 July 2020) 
Domanski, D., Gambacorta, L. and Picillo, C. (2015). “Central clearing: trends and current issues”, BIS 
Quarterly Review, December, pp. 59-76. 
Dörry, S. and Dymski, G. (2018). “Will Brexit reverse the centralizing momentum of global finance?” 
Geoforum, February 2018 
Duffie, D. and Zhu, H. (2011). “Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty risk?”, Review 
of Asset Pricing Studies, Vol. 1 No.1, pp.74-95. 
Duffie, D., Scheicher, M. and Vuillemey, G. (2015). “Central clearing and collateral demand”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 116 No.1, pp. 237-256 
Elliot, D. (2013). “Central counter-party loss-allocation rules”, Bank of England Financial Stability 
Paper, 20, pp.1-16. 
Eurex (2019). “Monthly Clearing Volumes”, available at: 
https://www.eurexclearing.com/resource/blob/1728592/cc86b5fb4481762f1ebc36d54aa54563/data/ec
ag_clearing_volumes_2019_12.pdf 
Eurex (2020). “Monthly Clearing Volumes”, available at: 
https://www.eurexclearing.com/resource/blob/1879400/83b64295f27cc28687cf519a199c7e9e/data/ec
ag_clearing_volumes_2020_02.pdf 
European Central Bank (2011). “Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework”, July 2011. 
European Central Bank (2017). “Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank”, 2017/C 212/04 
13 
 
European Central Bank (2018). “Withdrawal of the Recommendation of the ECB for a Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank”, available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/2019-03-20_-_ecb_letter_to_mr_tajani_-
_withdrawal_of_the_ecb_recommendat....pdf 
European Commission (2018a). “Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union on 30 March 2019: a Contingency Action Plan”. 13/11/2018. COM(2018) 880 final.  
European Commission (2018b). “Commission implementing decision determining, for a limited period 
of time, that the regulatory framework applicable to central counterparties in the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland is equivalent, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council”, 19/12/2018. COM(2018) 9139 final. 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (2012). “Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories No 648/2012”. Official Journal of the European Union, L 201/1 
European Securities and Market Authority (2017). “ESMA issues principles on supervisory approach 
to relocations from the UK”. Press Release, 31/05/2017, ESMA71-99-469. 
European Securities and Market Authority (2018a). “Managing risks of a no-deal Brexit in the area of 
central clearing”. Public Statement, 23/11/2018. ESMA70-151-1948 
European Securities and Market Authority (2018b). “ESMA is ready to review UK CCPs’ and CDS’ 
recognition applications for a no-deal Brexit scenario”. Public Statement, 19/12/2018. ESMA70-151-
2032. 
Express (2018). “Merkel’s Brexit warningG: Chancellor backs Frankfurt push to snatch London's euro 
clearing”, 6/9/2018, available at: https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1013871/Brexit-latest-news-
euro-clearing-Angela-Merkel-Frankfurt-London-Volker-Bouffier (last accessed 13 July 2020). 
General Court of the European Union (2015). “Judgement in Case T-496/11 United Kingdom vs. 
European Central Bank”, available at: http:// curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-
03/cp150029en.pdf. 
Global Custodian (2018). “Eurex Clearing gains ground with profit scheme for repo”, 6/12/2018, Global 
Custodian, available at: https://www.globalcustodian.com/eurex-clearing-gains-ground-profit-scheme-
repo/ (last accessed 13 July 2020). 
Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2017). “Brexit and the Single European Financial Market”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 149-164. 
Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2018). “Brexit and the battle for financial services”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol 25 No 8, pp. 1118-1136. 
Independent (2018). “Brexit: Deutsche Bank moves half of euro clearing business from London to 
Frankfurt”, 30/07/2018, available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/deutsche-
bank-brexit-staff-move-jobs-frankfurt-london-city-euro-clearing-a8469301.html (last accessed 13 July 
2020). 
Lannoo, K. (2017). “Derivatives Clearing and Brexit: A comment on the proposed EMIR revisions”, 
ECMI Policy Brief, No. 25. 
Lavery, S., McDaniel, S. And Schmid, D. (2018). “Finance fragmented? Frankfurt and Paris as 
European financial centres after Brexit”, Journal of European Public Policy,  pp. 1-19 
14 
 
Pirrong, C. (2011). “The economics of central clearing: Theory and practice”, ISDA Discussion Papers 
Series, No. 1. 
Posner, E. and Veron, N. (2010). “The EU and financial regulation: power without purpose?”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 400-415. 
Priem, R. (2018). “CCP Recovery and resolution; preventing a financial catastrophe”, Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp.351-364 
Rehlon, A. and Nixon, D. (2013). “Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how 
does the Bank supervise them?”,  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 147-156. 
Reuters (2009). “France wants ECB to lead derivatives clearing push”. 19/1/2009. Available at: 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/eu-creditderivatives-idUKLJ16478720090119 (last accessed 13 July 
2020). 
Reuters (2017). “Deutsche Boerse steps up clearing fight with London ahead of Brexit”, 9/10/2017, 
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-boerse-markets-clearing/deutsche-boerse-
steps-up-clearing-fight-with-london-ahead-of-brexit-idUSKBN1CE0H9?il=0 (last accessed 13 July 
2020). 
Reuters (2017b). “Exclusive: ECB plan to take euro clearing from London stalled by infighting”, 
22/05/2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-clearing-ecb/exclusive-ecb-
plan-to-take-euro-clearing-from-london-stalled-by-infighting-sources-idUSKBN18I1B2 (last accessed 
13 July 2020). 
Reuters (2018). “UK's risk of losing euro clearing after Brexit eases”, 16/05/2018 available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-clearing/uks-risk-of-losing-euro-clearing-after-brexit-
eases-idUSKCN1IH1OD (last accessed 13 July 2020). 
Schoenmaker, D. (2017). “The UK financial sector and EU integration after Brexit: the issue of 
passporting”, in Campos, N.F. and Coricelli, F. (eds.) The Economics of UK-EU Relations: From the 
Treaty of Rome to the Vote for Brexit. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 119-138. 
The Trade News (2020). “CCPs clash over Brexit impact on euro clearing activity”, 20/02/2020, 
available at: https://www.thetradenews.com/ccps-clash-brexit-impact-euro-clearing-activity/ (last 
accessed 13 July 2020). 
Timberlake, R.H. Jr. (1984). “The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations”, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 16 NO. 1, pp.1-15. 
UK Government’s Actuary Department (2017). “Investment news: monthly bulletin form the insurance 
and investment team”, July 2017, available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/629
670/Jun_2017_update.pdf  
Wendt, F. (2015). “Central Counterparties: addressing their too important to fail nature”, IMF Working 
Paper, pp.1-67. 
Wintour, P. (2016). “What's the best Brexit Theresa May could get for Britain?3”, The Guardian, 14 
July 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/14/whats-the-best-brexit-theresa-may-
could-get-for-britain 
Wouters, J., and Van Kerckhoven, S. (2011). “The EU’s Internal and External Regulatory Actions After 
the Outbreak of the 2008 Financial Crisis”, European Company Law, Vol. 8 No. 5, pp. 201-206. 
15 
 
Wouters, J., Van Kerckhoven, S. and Odermatt, J. (2013). “The EU at the G20 and the G20’s impact 
on the EU”, in Van Vooren, B.; Blockmans, S. and Wouters, J. (eds.) The EU's Role in Global 
Governance: The Legal Dimension. Oxford University Press, pp. 259-272 
Wouters, J. and Van Kerckhoven, S.  (2019). “The role of the EU in the G7 in times of populism, 
nationalism, and anti-globalism”, in Oldani, C. and Wouters,  J. (eds.)  The G7, anti-globalism and the 
governance of globalization. Routledge, pp. 68-90.  
 
